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 Abstract – The emerging need for mobile ad hoc networks and secured data transmission phase is of crucial importance 
depending upon the environments like military. In this paper, a new way to improve the reliability of message transmission 
is presented. In the open collaborative MANET environment, any node can maliciously or selfishly disrupt and deny 
communication of other nodes. Dynamic changing topology makes it hard to determine the adversary nodes that affect the 
communication in MANET.  
 
 An SMT protocol provides a way to secure message transmission by dispersing the message among several paths 
with minimal redundancy. The multiple routes selected are known as APS –Active Path Set. This paper describes a 
technique for fault discovery process to identify Byzantine failures which include nodes that drop, modify, or mis-route 
packets in an attempt to disrupt the routing service. An adaptive probing technique detects a malicious link through binary 
search and according to the nodes behavior, these links are avoided in the active path by multiplicatively increasing their 
weights. The proposed scheme provides secure communication even with increased number of adversaries. 
 
Index Terms: Byzantine Failure, Secure Routing, SMT-Secure Message Transmission, Binary Search Probing, Reliability, Active 
Path Set-APS. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Mobile Ad hoc networks are advantageous in situations 
where there are no network infrastructures available and when 
there is a need for people to communicate using mobile devices 
[5]. In mobile ad hoc networks, there is no central 
administration to take care of detection and prevention of 
anomalies. Therefore nodes have to cooperate for the integrity of 
the operation of the network. However, nodes may refuse to 
cooperate by not forwarding packets to others for selfish reasons 
and not want to exhaust their resources.  
The SMT protocol [1] safeguards pair wise communication 
across an unknown frequently changing network, possibly in the 
presence of adversaries that may exhibit arbitrary behavior. The 
scheme presented in this paper guarantee that a Byzantine fault 
will be identified and the fault link can be avoided in the data 
transmission phase. The current topological information will be 
gathered based on the network behavior such as transmission 
time, probability of lost packets and acknowledged packets. 
Based on the information gathered, the route metrics are updated 
and used in selecting the multiple paths [4]. In this way the 
reliability of the secured data transmission can be enhanced. 
2. PROBLEM DEFINITION 
2.1 Data Transmission in MANET 
In any type of MANETs, reliable delivery of information to 
the intended destination is of major interest to users sending 
information across that network. The information on the 
network might not be delivered to the destination as it is 
disrupted by the system because of many reasons. These reasons 
can be grouped into two categories, network faults and security 
attacks. In the former, main problem is to detect abnormal 
changes in the network and categorize them. Security attacks 
[19], [20] can be protected and authenticated by cryptography.  
However, cryptographic protection cannot be effective 
against network layer attacks especially like Byzantine attacks. 
A compromised intermediate node or a set of compromised 
intermediate nodes works in collusion and carries out attacks 
such as creating routing loops, routing packets on non optimal 
paths and selectively dropping packets are referred to as 
Byzantine attacks [10]. Byzantine failures are hard to detect. 
The network would seem to be operating normally in the 
viewpoint of nodes, though it may actually be exhibiting 
Byzantine behavior [6]. In contrast, the goal of a Byzantine node 
is to disrupt the communication of other nodes in the network, 
without regard to its own resource consumption [7]. 
Black Hole attack [18] is a basic Byzantine attack, where 
the adversary stops forwarding data packets, but still participates 
in the routing protocol correctly. As a result, whenever the 
adversarial node is selected as part of a path by the routing 
protocol, it prevents communication on that path from taking 
place. Most existing secure and insecure routing protocols are 
disrupted by black hole attacks because they render the normal 
methods of route maintenance futile. 
In Byzantine Wormhole attack more than one node is 
compromised, it is reasonable to assume that these nodes may 
interact in order to gain an additional advantage. This allows the 
adversary to perform a more effective attack. Indeed, one such 
attack is a Byzantine wormhole, where two adversaries collude 
by tunneling packets between each other in order to create a 
wormhole in the network [21]. 
The adversaries can send a route request and discover a 
route across the ad hoc network, then tunnel packets through the 
non-adversarial nodes to execute the attack. The adversaries can 
use the low cost appearance of the wormhole links in order to 
increase the probability of being selected as part of the route, 
and then attempt to disrupt the network by dropping all of the 
data packets.  Figure 1 shows the Byzantine wormhole attack, 
this is an extremely strong attack that can be performed even if 
only two nodes have been compromised. 
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Figure 1. Byzantine Wormhole Attack 
 
Byzantine wormhole attack considered in this work is 
different from the traditional wormhole attack. In the traditional 
wormhole attack, an adversary or multiple adversaries trick two 
honest nodes into believing that there exists a direct link 
between the honest nodes. The difference is that in the 
Byzantine case, the wormhole link exists between the 
adversarial nodes, not between the honest nodes. 
3. RELATED WORK 
The existing protocol SMT [1] for secured data 
communication provides end to end secure and robust feedback 
mechanism. A set of diverse and node disjoint paths are used at 
a time for data transmission and are known as Active Path Sets. 
The message and the redundancy are divided into a number of 
pieces, so that even a partial reception is able to reconstruct the 
data, called as Message dispersion [8] as shown in figure 2. The 
source updates the ratings of the paths based on the feedback. 
 
Figure 2. Message Dispersion in SMT 
Secure Routing Protocol [11] is an overlay security layer for 
already existing routing protocol such as DSR [12]. The 
protocol bases its security on the assumption that the source and 
the destination share an authentication primitive. The routing 
messages are protected by nodes end-to-end authentication. SRP 
uses the route redundancy between the two end-hosts to increase 
the robustness against malicious nodes. The network is protected 
against flooding of route requests by limiting the rate of route 
request processed at each node. The problem is that the 
neighbors are not authenticated so a malicious node can 
blackmail other nodes by sending forged route requests. 
Besides, SRP does not make any assumption on the route 
request propagation algorithm as it is using the underlying 
protocol’s one which is not optimized to find disjoint paths. 
Although the selection of paths based on reliability as a 
routing metric has not been proposed before, other protocols 
have examined how to relate path availability to routing 
decisions. The (α,t)-Cluster algorithm [13] uses path availability 
to organize a MANET into clusters and provide a hybrid routing 
approach that is proactive within the cluster and reactive   
 
between clusters. While this protocol can group nodes into 
clusters among which path availability can be bounded, it does 
not help the selection among competing paths. Signal Stability-
Based Adaptive (SSA) [14] and Associativity-Based Routing 
(ABR) [15] protocols propose two different mechanisms for 
assessing link stability. They both rely on periodic beaconing in 
order to estimate the link failure rates. SSA nodes collect 
statistics of the quality of their incident links based on the link 
utilization. Both protocols employ on-demand flooding of the 
network with route requests, which accumulate the 
corresponding stability metrics, and the destination chooses the 
most stable route. However, none of these protocols investigate 
the use of multiple paths or a way to select a set of such 
redundant paths. 
4. THE PROPOSED SCHEME 
4.1 Overview 
The block diagram shown in Figure 3 is the Overall view of 
proposed system. The security of data transmission can be 
increased by selecting most secured routes in Active Path Set 
(APS). To improve the performance of the secured message 
transmission, most reliable paths can be selected and included in 
active path set –APS. Two mechanisms can be provided to 
select the most reliable paths: 
Detect the misbehaving nodes and report such events. 
Maintain a traffic pattern reflecting the past behavior of other 
nodes. 
The best routes can be selected which comprises of nodes 
that do not have history of avoiding forwarding packets along 
established routes. The path as a whole which includes the 
genuine nodes will be discarded in the SMT path selection 
mechanism [3]. In this proposed scheme instead of avoiding the 
whole path only the links that are incident on the adversary 
nodes will be excluded. Upon detection of a misbehaving node, 
a report is generated and nodes update the rating of the reported 
misbehaving nodes. The ratings of the nodes along a well 
behaved route are periodically incremented while reception of a 
misbehavior node dramatically decreases node rating. When a 
new route is required the source node calculates the average of 
the ratings of the nodes in each of the route replies and selects 
the route with highest metric. In this system the routes will be 
categorized according to attributes such as length and whether 
the routes include any additional trusted nodes other than the 
destination. 
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Figure 3. Overall view of proposed system 
 
4.2 Route Discovery Process 
Here both the route request and route discovery are 
flooded in the network. A digital signature [16] is used to 
authenticate the source. This signature will prevent unauthorized 
route request and avoids unnecessary flooding in the network. 
The route request is forwarded hop by hop and digital signatures 
are used at each hop to prevent an adversary from specifying an 
arbitrary path [2].The route discovery phase consists of the 
following phases. 
Request Initiation 
The source creates and signs a request that includes the 
destination, the source, a sequence number and a weight list. 
The source then broadcasts this request to its neighbors. The 
source’s signature allows the destination and intermediate nodes   
to authenticate the request and prevents false route requests. 
Request Propagation 
The route requests are propagated by the intermediate 
nodes. Each request is checked against the list maintained by it. 
If it is distinct then the source signature is validated, stored in 
the list and then re – broadcasted. If the entire packet is verified 
then the node appends its identifier to the end of the packet and 
broadcasts the modified request. 
Response Initiation and Reception 
Upon receiving the request, destination node verifies 
the authenticity. It signs in the response and then broadcasts it. 
The source also performs the same verification as done by the 
intermediate nodes and stores in the source route list. 
4.3 Byzantine Fault Detection 
Detection Scheme 
Proposed system discovers faulty links on the path 
from the source to the destination. An adaptive probing 
technique identifies a faulty link after log n faults have occurred, 
where n is the length of the path. It requires the destination to 
return an acknowledgement to the source for every successfully 
received packet. The source keeps track of the number of recent 
losses. If the number of recent losses violates the acceptable 
threshold, the system will register a fault between the source and 
the destination. Then a binary search will start on the path in 
order to identify the faulty link.  
The source controls the search by specifying a list of 
intermediate nodes on data packets. Each node in the list in 
addition to the destination must send an acknowledgement to the 
source. The list of nodes those have to send acknowledgements 
are known as probe nodes. Since the list of probed nodes is 
specified on legitimate traffic, an adversary is unable to drop 
traffic.  
 Binary Search in adaptive Probes 
The list of probes defines a set of non- overlapping intervals 
that covers the whole path where each interval covers the sub 
path between the consecutive probes that forms its end points. 
When a fault is detected on an interval, the interval will be 
divided into two by inserting a new probe. This new probe is 
added to the list of probes appended to future packets. The 
process of subdivision continues until a fault is detected on the 
interval that corresponds to a single link. This result in finding 
log n faults where n is the length of the path. From Figure 4, h 
node is the adversary node. 
 
Figure 4. Binary Search- Finding Faulty Links Using Probe 
Signals 
4.4 Key Management 
Shared keys are used between the source and the probed 
nodes. This can be done by on demand Diffie-Hellmann key 
exchange algorithm [17]. This key mechanism is integrated into 
the route discovery protocol. 
4.5 Calculating the Path Metric 
After a sender and a receiver start to exchange data packets, 
they build tables to keep traffic patterns. Each table is composed 
of two fields: Packet identification number and time of action. 
Each time a packet is sent, the sender records the packet ID and 
the time. Each time a packet is received a receiver records the 
packet ID and the time.  
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Trip Time Variation (∆Tt) 
Trip time of each packet is the time a packet spends on the 
way, starting when it is transmitted, ending when it is received. 
That time is calculated using the sender’s time stamp when a 
packet was sent and recipient’s time stamps when a packet was 
received.  
 Tt   = Tr   -    Ts   (4.1) 
Here, Ts is the time a packet is sent and Tr the time it is 
received. In order to measure how long it would normally take a 
packet to travel from source to destination, estimated reference 
time variable (TE) is calculated. The estimated reference time 
can be given by the sum of the duration of the time of the route 
request message and the duration of the route reply message 
divided by two. 
 (4.2) 
 Having the TE value calculated in equation (4.2), we can 
calculate the Trip Time Variation (∆Tt) of each packet. The 
variation of trip time is measured with respect to the difference 
of estimated reference time and trip time experienced by the 
packet in the network. 
∆Tt = TE – Tt            (4.3) 
Observing trip time variations over a period of time will 
allow the computation of probability of a packet to be delayed. 
Comparing trip time variation of many packets helps noticing 
and examining regular delays that are most likely to be caused 
by attacks 
Change of packets frequency (∆Pf) 
The sender compares both the frequency at which packets 
were sent and the frequency at which packets were received, 
measured in packets per second. By comparing the two 
frequencies, delays of packets can be noticed.  
Lost Packets: (lp) 
By looking at the anomaly detection table, it is easy to see 
packets that have been sent but not received. When there is a 
packet identification entry with sent time, but without received 
time, it shows that a packet was sent but not received. That 
packet could have been dropped after a time out on the queue, or 
it could have been dropped intentionally by an attacker. 
Anomaly Function is Af 
Af = f (∆Tt, ∆Pf, lp)   (4.4) 
Here ∆Tt  is trip time variation of packets, ∆Pf  is change of 
packet frequency, lp is lost packets. 
Link Failures 
Upon finding the link failure using binary search probes, all 
the paths containing that link will be discarded by increasing the 
link weights that are incident on those adversaries. 
4.6 Trust Updation and Path Set Selection 
An initial value is assigned to the variable of trust related to 
a path. A threshold is set to be based on expected behavior of 
the network environment. Based on the observation the paths 
metrics are updated and are used as a parameter while selecting 
the active path set. 
5. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
The experiments substantiate that the proposed system can, 
indeed successfully cope with a high number of adversaries, 
Active Path Set Secure Message Transmission (APS-SMT) can 
deliver many packets successfully than Non-Secure Protocol 
(NSP). APS-SMT is successful in delivering data with low, end-
to-end delay. 
 Evaluation is done for two protocols (i) a single path data 
forwarding protocol that does not deploy any security 
mechanism to forward data called NSP (ii) In APS-SMT 
protocol, Multiple APS routes are discovered for SMT at the 
expense of increased overhead per route discovery, while single 
route discovered for NSP. OPNET simulation models were 
implemented. 
 
Figure 5a.  Performance of APS-SMT 
 
 
 
Figure 5b. Performance of NSP 
Figure 5. Performance Evaluation of APS-SMT vs NSP 
The network coverage is a 500m by 500m with 50 mobile 
nodes, with any two nodes able to communicate if they are 
within the reception distance which is set to 150m. The nodes 
are initially uniformly distributed throughout the network area 
and their movement is determined by the random way point 
mobility model [9]. 
The benefit of APS-SMT is clearly shown in the figure 5a. 
Thus APS-SMT delivers 99% of packets within the 5 to 15 
adversaries and more than 95% of the packets even when 50% 
of the nodes are malicious. In contrast, the fast degradation of 
the NSP protocol as no surprise, as shown in figure 5b. The 
average APS-SMT improvement ranges from 32% to 150% as 
the number of adversaries increases. 
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6. CONCLUSION 
In this paper, a design for an enhanced secured data 
transmission mechanism which is able to detect and remove the 
Byzantine failures has been presented. Path metric is evaluated 
by use of fault detection scheme, acknowledgements and trip 
time. Based on the evaluation, highly reliable paths can be 
chosen as multiple paths for SMT. 
The successful delivery of message with the ability to 
disperse and avoidance of faulty links is more reliable than 
ordinary secured data transmission mechanism. It can be used in 
situations where reliability and security is most wanted like 
MANET in military. 
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